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ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS CONCERNING PROPERTY
SETTLEMENTS
Antenuptial contracts concerning property are agreements
letween parties who are contemplating marriage, marriage
being the consideration whereby the respective rights of each in
the ther's property are settled for the present and future. The
validity of such contracts is determined by the law of contracts'
and according to public policy.- Although it may be believed
that antenuptial contracts are contrary to public policy, they
-ire, in fact, favored by the courts if they contain certain essen-
tial elements. 
3
First and foremost, the agreement must be made in contem-
plation that the marriage relation shall subsist until the parties
are separated by death. 4  Contracts which facilitate divorce or
separation by providing for a settlement only in case of such oc-
currence. are void as against public policy.:, However, in cases
where the contract does not facilitate divorce, and the death of
mne party is not by the terms of the contract made a prerequi-
site to its performance, a property settlement by the court in
connection with an absolute divorce, will not be controlled by the
-iontract, although the court may permit it to be introduced as
,vidence." If the a!reement provides for a settlement in case of
either separation or death, and a separation does not take place,
the invalid provision as to the separation will not void the valid
I 1l. visiolls.
7
'Collins v. Phillips, 259 Ii. 405, 102 N. E. 796 (1913); Cummings
v. Wood, 197 Iowa 1356, 199 N. W. 369 (1924); Key v. Collins, 145
Tenn. 106, 236 S. W. 3 (1921).
'Bohanan v. Maxwell, 190 Iowa 1308, 181 N. W. 683, 14 A. L. R.
1004 (1921); Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820 (1908).
Kuhnen v. Kuhnen, 351 Ill. 591, 184 N. E. 874 (1933); Straton v.
Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S. W. 522 (1916); Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 215
N. Y. S. 184, 216 App. Div. 362 (1926); Leonard v. Prentice, 171 Okla.
522, 43 P. (2d) 776 (1935).
'Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S. W. (2d) 783 (1928).
-Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 216 Pac. 92 (1923);
Straton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S. W. 522 (1916); Cumming v.
Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 102 S. E. 572 (1920).
"White v. White, 112 Neb. 850, 201 N. W. 662 (1924); See Best v.
Best, 218 Ky. 648, 291 S. W. 1032 (1927).
,Kalsem v. Froland, 207 Iowa 994, 222 N. W. 3 (1928); Straton
v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S. W. 522 (1916).
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Second, the wife must have some knowledge as to the nature
and extent of the prospective husband's property. The courts
are not in accord as to how such knowledge must be attained or
what amount of knowledge is required, in order for the contract
to be binding. The court in In re Flannery's E.s-at"' considered
it to be incumbent upon the husband to disclose the full extent,
value and nature of his wealth without a request by the prospe,-
tive wife, even though the wife had been his neighbor for several
years and had a general knowledge of his property. However,
the court in Pollock v. Jameson0 said that the husband was under
no obligation to disclose the extent of his property, in the absence
of a request by the prospective wife, who had a reasonable op-
portunity to know of his financial condition. The Illinois courts
have consistently held that the agreement is valid if the prospec-
tive wife knew, or reasonably should have known, the nature and
extent of the husband's estate.1 0  The Wisconsin court, in Ini rc
Koeffler's Estate," discussed the above rules and held that they
did not apply in that state. The court then set out a new rule
based on the relationship of the parties. The court held that in
cases where the wife depends upon the husband's statements,
because of love or ignorance, the husband is under a duty to
fully disclose all the facts as to his wealth. However, if the mar-
riage is between older people and the motive of marriage is con-
venience and not young love, there is normally no confidential
relationship. Therefore, there is no duty on the husband to dis-
close his wealth in the absence of a request by the wife. This
seems to be the better view. There is certainly little justification
for voiding a contract for mere non-disclosure where the parties
are in fact dealing at arm's length. The chief objection to the
Wisconsin rule is the difficulty in determining the motive for
the marriage or whether the wife was in fact depending on the
husband for disclosure and advice. However, there is usually
evidence before the court which will aid in establishing these
facts, such as age, wealth and the intelligence of the prospective
wife.
$315 Pa. 576, 173 AtI. 303 (1934).
"70 F. (2d) 756, 63 App. D. C. 152 (1934).
" Brown v. Brown, 329 Ill. 198, 160 N. E. 149 (1928); Yockey v.
Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N. E. 34 (1915).
1215 Wis. 115, 254 N. W. 363 (1934).
STUDENT NOTES
The courts have been in accord in holding that if the wife.
had adequate knowledge of her husband's property, she can not
avoid the contract because she did not know her legal rights
Concerniln"' it.12
Third, if the agreement on its face shows that the provision
for the wife is inadequate and greatly disproportionate to the
wealth of the husband, there is a presumption that the agreement
was not made in good faith.'1 This presumption puts the bur-
den of proving that the contract is valid on the husband or those
,laiming through him. From a practical point of view this pre-
sumption, although rebuttable, is likely to cause the contract to
be void, due to the fact that in the majority of these cases the
husband is dead and normally there are no other witnesses to
refute the wife's allegation that she did not know the nature and
extent of the husband's wealth. Therefore, it is very important
to determine what the provision in the agreement must be in
order to be adequate. In the light of the cases it is difficult if
not impossible to say what test the court will apply to determine
the adequacy of the provision in a particular case. For example,
would the court consider the provision adequate in the following
case:
An antenuptial contract provides that the wife will accept
$1,000 in lieu of all her rights to the husband's property, in-
cluding dower, etc. The evidence shows that the husband's
estate was valued at $3,000 at the time of the contract. At the
time of his death the husband was worth $20,000.
The courts have uniformly held that the husband's wealth,
when compared to the provision for the wife, is to be judged at
the time of the contract and not at the time of his death. 14 But
does it necessarily follow that the agreement will be upheld, even
though the provision was proportionate to his wealth at the time
the contract was made? The wealth of the husband is only one
of niny circumstances to be considered by the court in deter-
mining adequacy. Some courts make a test by saying that the
provision in the agreement must allow the wife to live as coin-
fortably after the death of her husband, as she had previously
'' Robbins v. Robbins, 225 Ill. 333, 80 N. E. 326 (1907); Kingsley
v. Noble, 129 Neb. 808, 263 N. W. 222 (1935).
" Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S. W. (2d) 937 (1935); Tilton
v. Tilton, 130 Ky. 281, 113 S. W. 134 (1908); in Re Warner's Estate,
207 Pa. 580, 57 At. 35 (1904).
" Rolfe v. Rolfe, 125 Me. 82, 130 Atl. 877 (1925).
L. J.-5
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lived.15 Other courts compare the provision of the agreement
to the amount the wife would receive under the statute of descent
and distribution.1" Under either of these tests the court would
not enforce the agreement in the hypothetical case above. The
majority of the courts do not bind themselves to any test for ade-
quacy but decide each case on its own particular circum-
stances. 17 These courts take into consideration the wealth of
the husband, the premarital wealth of the wife, the life ex-
pectancies of both parties, and all other circumstances of the
case.
In cases where it is shown that the wife had substantial
property before marriage, the courts will not void a contract
whereby each party disclaims any interest in the other's prop-
erty.1 Nor will the courts void a contract whereby a wife
without means relinquishes all her rights to the husband's
property, if the presumption of fraud is sufficiently rebutted.
1"
There are certain other limitations on antenuptial contracts.
There are some legal rights which a spouse cannot relinquish by
agreement. In French v. McAnarniey,2" the agreement stated
that the husband would not be responsible for the support of the
wife. The court held that such an agreement was void. The
law imposes a duty on the husband to support his wife and the
wife cannot waive the right by an agreement before marriage.
There are also state statutes which prohibit the waiver of certain
interests by a wife by antenuptial contract. For example,
North Dakota has a statute which prevents homestead rights
from being waived.2 1  Also, a statute in Texas prevents an
antenuptial contract from changing the order of property de-
scent from that provided by the statute of descent and distri-
bution.2 2  Ordinarily, however, the common law governs ante-
nuptial contracts.
23
In Re Groff's Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 19 A. (2d) 107 (1941); In re
Clark's Estate, 303 Pa. 538, 154 Atl. 919 (1931).
"GBaker v. Baker, - Tenn. -, 142 S. W. (2d) 737 (1940).
Wulf v. Wulf, 129 Neb. 158, 261 N. W. 159 (1935).
'sRieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33, 115 N. W. 560 (1908).
"'Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N. E. 34 (1915); Gordon v.
Munn, 87 Kan. 624, 125 Pac. 1 (1912); Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414,
87 S. W. (2d) 937 (1935); Gaines v. Gaines, 163 Ky. 260, 173 S. W.
774 (1915).
290 Mass. 544, 195 N. E. 714 (1935).
=Swingle v. Swingle, 36 N. D. 611, 162 N. W. 912 (1917).
Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) Sec. 4610.
McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N. M. 27, 85 P. (2d) 78 (1938).
STUDENT NOTES
As call be seen from the cases cited, antenuptial contracts
are generally valid if they are made in good faith and in con-
templation of a permanent marriage.
The majority of the reported cases are contracts between
older persons or between an elderly man and a young girl, in
which the real purpose of the contract is to prevent the wife from
claiming her part of the husband's estate, which she would nor-
inally receive through the statute of descent and distribution.
It may be argued that this is not consistent with public policy.
The legislature has seen fit to prescribe the manner in which
the property of a deceased husband shall descend, even to the
extent of allowing a wife to renounce the will of her husband and
claim her rights under the descent and distribution statute.24
If the husband cannot will his property entirely away from the
wife after marriage, should he be allowed to contract her rights
away from her prior to marriage? In cases where the contract-
ig parties are older persons with separate estates, such agree-
ments provide a sound and convenient method for settling
property rights between the parties. However, in cases where
the wife has no separate estate, the court should carefully scruti-
nize the contract, even when there is considerable evidence that
the wife knew the value of her husband's estate at the time the
('ontract was made. It is not a sound policy to allow a husband
to disinherit his wife by contract prior to marriage, especially
when she has no other means of support. " 5
A. E. FUNK, JR.
"Gallup v. Rule, 81 Colo. 335, 255 Pac. 463 (1927); Ewing v.
Ewing, 255 Ky. 27, 72 S. W. (2d) 712 (1934); Kramer v. Crosby,
266 Mass. 525, 165 N. E. 686 (1929).
' The writer has used cases where the wife endeavors to avoid
the contract, but the law is the same where the husband is bringing
action. If the terms of the contract would be invalid as to the wife,
similar considerations are apt to make them invalid as to the hus-
band. Appleby v. Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305, 10 Ann.
Cas. 563 (1907).
